

I. Army Force Management Process.

Introduction: The Army force management process provides prudent adjustments to the existing force, while balancing force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) within available and planned resources (people, equipment, time, and resources). Force structure adjustments are based on guidance, constraints, and previous leadership decisions.

Recognize that we start this process with an existing force structure within the Army. That is, we are modifying existing force structure, not developing a force from scratch.

The role of the Army is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. The global social and political environment, in which that role must be played, is shifting dramatically. No one can predict when, how or where the United States may be called upon to project military power. To accomplish the mission of deterring conflict and winning wars, the Army must continuously change in order to provide the most combat effective force, within available resources, for joint and expeditionary roles.

Successfully integrating changes in doctrine, organizations, and materiel into the Army, requires synchronizing multiple echelons of command and diverse management structures and systems. This is not possible unless professionals at all levels understand as much about how the Army organizes, trains, and equips forces, as they do about how the Army fights. The actions to create a capable force are those that structure, man, equip, train, sustain, station, deploy and fund organizations.

The Army must manage force structure changes. The Army Force Management Model is the process the Army has adapted to graphically depict how it will manage force structure changes.

“Ours is the business of CHANGE.” LTG Richard Trefry, USA (Ret).

Figure 1 depicts the graphic found in Chapter 2 of the Army War College text, “*How the Army Runs*” (HTAR) and page 1 of this primer. This primer compliments, updates and amplifies the information contained in the Army War College text. **Figure 1**, summarizes the major functions and processes. **Figure 1** will be used to orient you as you move through the sequence of this primer, highlighting each of the functions as they are discussed.




Figure 1

II. Army Force Management Model

a. General:

1. **CAUTION:** Many of the Force Management processes are *evolving*. Change is continuous in the force management business. Several initiatives have the potential of significantly changing how the Army manages change in the future. Decision Points in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), Business Transformation / Institutional Adaptation and Total Army Analysis modification to support Army Force Generation (AFORGEN) are examples.
2. This model reflects a “System of Systems” approach.
3. Each process provides an essential force management function; and more importantly, the model shows how these functions relate to each other. Additionally, the model

demonstrates the relationships of Army processes to each other and to the major Department of Defense (DoD) management processes.

4. The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change using many interrelated and complex processes.
5. Although this diagram depicts a fairly linear model, in a **sequential** manner, managing change may mandate that any one or several of these processes occur **simultaneously**, in **parallel**, in **compressed** format or in **reverse**, depending on **urgency**, **risk** and senior leader **guidance**.
6. Eventually all of the steps must take place to produce a fully trained, equipped and resourced operational force at the place and at the right time, with the required capabilities for the Combatant Commanders.
7. The Army has adapted the force management model (figure 1) to develop balanced and synchronized solutions to the strategy and policy established through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
8. In the Army Force Management process, strategic and senior leadership guide the processes for determining warfighting requirements, conducting research and development. In addition, prioritizing resources provides input to the force development process. The resulting product of force development provides the basis for the force integrating function of acquiring and distributing materiel, as well as acquiring, training and distributing personnel in the Army.

b. Army Force Management Model Sequence

Determine Strategic and Operational Requirements

1. **DETERMINE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**. This is where the PURPLE (DoD) and GREEN (Army) interface. OSD starts the process with the receipt of national security directives, initiating the interrelated OSD planning systems displayed in the upper right graphic of **figure 2**.
2. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) **DRIVE** the Army's future force structure. Guidance from the President of the United States, decisions by OSD, products from the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE), directives and initiatives of the Joint Staff (JS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) are all initiating actions or processes in the DoD level planning process.




Figure 2

3. The Defense Planning Process establishes the bridge from OSD and JS guidance to the Army's PPBE process. The Army's planning and programming processes develop Army force structure, designed to meet the guidance from the President, OSD, and the needs of the Combatant Commanders. The *Defense Planning Process has four steps*.
 - a. Step 1 -- identifies the "NATIONAL VALUES and INTERESTS". These are articulated in the President's National Security Strategy providing common direction to OSD, the Combatant Commander's and the Services.
 - b. Step 2 -- assesses the THREAT to these "VALUES" and "INTERESTS". The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) formulates the Defense Policy / Guidance and the National Defense Strategy (NDS)
 - c. Step 3 -- the Chairman, Joint Chiefs Staff (JCS) subsequently recommends the National Military Strategy (NMS) that describes the MILITARY STRATEGY and the CAPABILITIES required to execute that strategy.
 - d. Step 4 -- determines the most effective mix of forces, weapons and manpower (all Services) to execute our defense policy and military strategy, and ultimately build Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions. The NMS articulates military strategy and provides force structure guidance to the services, incorporated in the Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG). **Figure 3** reflects the Strategic Guidance Hierarchy and the relationship of the NSS, NDS, QDR, and DPPG in building and resourcing the force.

- 1) The DPPG provides planning and programming direction to the Services in preparation for the development of the Services' POM submissions.
- 2) The DPPG translates the National Defense Strategy into force development priorities. These force development priorities are described as capability priorities with specific guidance for reducing capability gaps.
- 3) The DPPG provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the Services to program towards the strategic objectives.




Figure 3

4. Displayed across the center-right of the Determine Strategic and Operational Requirements graphic are the major OSD planning systems depicted in Figure 2. Figure 3 provides additional details, at the OSD level, for the relationship of documents, guidance, products, players and decision points.
 - a. Global Force Management (GFM) accounts for the forces and capabilities committed to ongoing operations, identifies the most appropriate and responsive force or capability and identifies the risk associated with recommendations. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) consolidates five separate documents forcing a

holistic focus to the planning and programming efforts. GEF provides guidance to the Forces for Memo, The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the GFM Implementation Guidance.

- b. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). JSPS is the formal structure for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to meet his statutory responsibilities to assess the strategic environment, provide military advice, and provide unified direction to the Armed Forces. The Chairman in consultation with members of the JCS and Combatant Commanders, assist the President and SECDEF in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advises the SECDEF on programming priorities; prepares strategic plans; and assesses and advises the SECDEF on the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Services and DoD combat support agencies.
 - c. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process is focused towards producing a plan, program and defense budget that is capability driven, providing the best mix of forces, equipment, and support available for the Combatant Commanders within resources. DoD PPBE incorporates policy, strategy and guidance in the DPPG to the Services to develop their POM submissions.
5. The **key output**, which initiates the Army Planning System, is the programming guidance that is currently provided by the SECDEF in the GPPG.
 6. OSD has initiated the Global Force Management (GFM) Process. The purpose of GFM is to integrate the assignment, allocation and apportionment processes into a single process; account for forces and capabilities committed; identify the most appropriate and responsive force or capability; identify risk associated with recommendations; improve our ability to win overlapping campaigns; improve responsiveness to unforeseen contingencies; and provide predictability to rotational forces. OSD has developed new guidance documents to meet the needs for “**Employ the Force**”, “**Manage the Force**” and “**Develop the Force**”. Figure 4 displays the Strategic Planning Process, documents and hierarchy at OSD level.



Figure 4

Develop Capabilities

1. **DEVELOP CAPABILITIES** is the function that has evolved the most. A primer has been developed and updated (<http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil>) providing customers with an understanding of the process, decision points and outputs.
2. The receipt of OSD and Senior Army Leader guidance initiates the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The objective of JCIDS is to develop a

balanced and synchronized DOTMLPF solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable and based on mature technology. JCIDS identifies capabilities needed to accomplish the **strategic** and **operational requirements**. The capabilities are investigated within the **DOMAINS** of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities, commonly referred to as the domains of DOTMLPF (**figure 5**).

3. DOTMLPF format originated in the Army. Each domain of DOTMLPF is an area providing focus for action officers to investigate solutions, products, and services to meet the required capabilities delineated in DoD directives. DOTMLPF is a very useful tool for looking at a large issue or set of issues, and breaking it apart into more discrete, manageable sets of tasks and deliverables.




Figure 5

4. JCIDS develops an integrated set of Army DOTMLPF requirements that support national strategies and guidance, and operational needs of the combatant commanders. This process assesses future Joint and Army warfighting functional needs and solutions.
5. The analysis process is composed of a structured, four-phased methodology that defines **capability gaps**, **capability needs**, and approaches to provide those capabilities within a specified functional or operational area. The four phases are: Joint Operational Environment (JOE), Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). Based on national defense policy and centered on a common joint warfighting construct, the analyses initiates the development of integrated, joint capabilities investigating solutions within Army domains of DOTMLPF.
6. JCIDS is that capabilities-based approach to identify current and future capability gaps and the Joint Forces ability to carry out Joint warfighting missions and functions.
7. This process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost.
8. TRADOC's Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) submits DOTMLPF solution sets for ARSTAF validation and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) approval via the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation and approval process.
9. The **key output** is the recommendation of a solution set within the domain of DOTMLPF to the ARSTAF.
10. The Army Force Management School focuses instruction primarily in the domains of **Organizational change** and **Materiel solutions**.

Materiel Acquisition Management Process

NOTE: Non-materiel solutions are analyzed first. Non-materiel solutions are normally quicker to implement and cost less.

1. If the DOTMLPF solution to the capability gap or shortcoming is determined to be within the **materiel domain**, hardware is developed to meet the requirement. Materiel solutions are developed within the Defense Acquisition Management System (**figure 6**).
2. In the broadest sense, the Acquisition process consists of a series of **sequential management decisions**, made within **DoD**, the Army Secretariat (**ARSEC**) or the **ARSTAF**, as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated Materiel Requirement to the fielding of an **operational and supportable** system, in accordance with DoD INSTRUCTIONS **5000.1** and **5000.2**.




Figure 6

5. Materiel Developers document the changes in Equipment and Personnel, and the Equipment distribution through the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP).
6. The **key output** of this sub-process is the Basis of Issue Plan feeder data (**BOIPFD**) and a fully operational, affordable and sustainable system. The BOIPFD is the primary input to the BOIP, a requirements document, developed in the next phase by the United States Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA). The BOIP is discussed in the Develop Organization Models phase.

Design Organizations

1. If, however, the DOTMLPF solution developed in the “Develop Capabilities” section is an **Organizational Solution**, we move to the **DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS PHASE**. In this phase (**figure 7**), we address **new** organizations and **modification** to existing organizations. The Design Organizations phase analyzes the proposed organization for **doctrinal correctness**. The Design Organizations phase provides a forum for the entire Army, to review the issue and links the Capabilities, Materiel, Training, and Document Developers together.
2. Organizational requirements flowing from the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA), determine whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow’s battlefield. Once identified, organizational requirements are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes:

- Unit Reference Sheet (URS) development;
- Force Design Update (FDU) process;
- Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) development;
- Basis-of-Issue Plan (BOIP) development.

3. Unit Reference Sheet (URS). Proposed organizational solutions to meet desired capabilities require the development of a URS. The URS contains sufficient data about a unit's personnel and equipment to support Army force design initiatives. The URS captures relevant data such as a proposed unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations.




Figure 7

4. Force Design Update (FDU). The next step is the **FDU** process (figure 8).

a. Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Force Design Directorate (FDD), at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, shepherds the FDU process for the Army.

b. This is where we take a good idea from a variety of sources, staff them through the proponent centers and schools, forward to FDD to ensure the proposed organizational solution is **doctrinally correct**, gain approval from the Commanding General (CG) of TRADOC and forward to the CSA/VCSA for **decision and implementation instructions**.

- c. The FDU process serves as the link between the development of the URS and development of the TOE (the URS ultimately leads to a TOE).
- d. During the FDU process, the Unit Reference Sheet (URS) is staffed throughout the Army.
- e. The FDU develops a consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing organizations.




Figure 8

5. The **key output** is an approved design and implementation instructions from the CSA or VCSA.

Develop Organizational Models

1. We start this phase with two potential inputs:
 - a. A Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) for a new piece of equipment from the Materiel Acquisition Management System – **OR**

- b. A FDU decision for an organizational change from the Design Organization section.
- 2. Following approval during the FDU process, the unit reference sheet (URS) or design (currently wiring diagrams from briefing charts) goes to United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA).
- 3. USAFMSA and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the FDU process (URS basic design) or the Materiel Acquisition Management Process (BOIP feeder data) at **Figure 9**.




Figure 9

- 4. USAFMSA, USASOC and MEDCOM apply **rules, standards, and guidance** to the doctrinally correct design to produce a new organizational model – called the Table of Organization and Equipment or TOE, or modifies an existing TOE (**figure 10**). The TOE is a requirements document and is the definition of a fully mission-capable organization.




Figure 10

- a. A TOE prescribes the doctrinal wartime mission, organizational structure, personnel and equipment requirements for a military unit and is the model for authorization documents.
- b. TOEs depict mission-essential wartime requirements (MEWR) for sustained combat operations and provide models for levels of organization for units when available resources dictate that all like units cannot be organized at their full wartime requirement (that is -- less than Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 1.
- c. The URS provides approximate quantities for people and equipment. The approved organizational design (TOE) captures personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible. Personnel quantities are developed and documented in the TOE by paragraph, line number, grade, military occupational specialty (MOS), skill level, and quantity. Equipment is by paragraph, line item number (LIN), type, and quantity.
- 5. USAFMSA USASOC and MEDCOM develop TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the URS basic design or the BOIP feeder data.
 - a. TOE development is adequately covered above.

- b. USAFMSA develops Basis of Issue Plans (BOIPs). BOIPs are requirement documents that specify the change in personnel and equipment for each organization. The BOIP specifies the addition of personnel by grade, skill level, MOS, paragraph, line number, and quantity. Equipment is specified by LIN, paragraph, line number, quantity and ERC. Also, BOIPs apply to organizations which might not be issued the primary system, but provide support, maintenance, or command/control to the unit listed in the BOIP.

6. The TOES and BOIPS are **KEY OUTPUT** documents from this process.

Determine Organizational Authorizations

- 1. After HQDA approves the TOE, the desired “unit type” enters into the resourcing phase, where the organizational model competes for resources through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE). The **DETERMINE**




Figure 11

ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS phase provides the proper mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced and affordable force structure, which supports the strategic, and operational planning from Joint and Army Guidance (**figure 11**). Guidance for this phase includes externally imposed constraints of dollars, total strength by component, roles, and missions for each component.

The guidance includes the **Directed Force (figure 12)**. The directed force is currently: 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (45 for the Active Component and 28 for the Army National Guard).

2. **ARMY GUIDANCE:**

- a. Similar to the guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Army leadership provides guidance and direction. The Army Plan (TAP)

QDR 2010 Army Force Structure* – FY 11-15

- 4 Corps headquarters
- 18 Division headquarters
- 73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component (AC) and 28 Reserve Component (RC)), consisting of:
 - 40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs)
 - 8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs)
 - 25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs)
- 21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)
- 15 Patriot battalions and 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries
- 3 Ranger Battalions & SOF forces**

“Our judgment with regard to the overall capacity of the force reflects in part the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by ongoing operations. As those demands evolve, so too might the appropriate size and mix of forces.”

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Figure 12

is the principal guidance provided from the Secretary of the Army (SA) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) to the Army Secretariat (ARSEC), ARSTAF, commands, DRUs and FOAs for building the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The TAP provides guidance on Strategy, Threat Data, Resource Priorities and Force Structure Guidance.

- b. Additionally, the SA, CSA, VCSA, G-3/5/7 and G-8, provide the directives and guidance to the ARSEC, ARSTAF and commands (ACOMs, ASCC and DRUs) in form, substance, direction and process to accomplish the missions through the Army Planning System and develop force structure to meet OSD guidance.
- c. To move from the current force to the future force, we have to understand the inputs or guidance that modifies the current force, when they are issued and the interrelated processes.
 - 1) **Figure 13** portrays some of the guidance and documents influencing and directing the PPBE process. Additional documents and guidance not displayed include AC/RC Rebalance, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Army Campaign Plan (ACP), Army Posture Statement (APS) and the Army Modernization Strategy.
 - 2) Based on the guidance, TAA modifies the current force, identifies the total requirements and ultimately resources the future force.

3. **Determine Organizational Authorizations** is an extremely complicated sequence of processes and sub-processes, involving a significant amount of staff work, man-hours and sequential decision points. Once HQDA approves the TOE, the unit type competes for resources through the PPBE process. The PPBE process is discussed in detail in the PPBE primer found at <http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil>.




Figure 13

- 4. This phase determines the correct mix of organizations required and resourced to meet the guidance.
- 5. **Figure 13** represents the flow of the PPBE process. The TAA process is what moves the PPBE process from Planning to Programming, providing the **POM FORCE** as input to the G-8, Program Analysis and Evaluation Division (PA&E).

TAA process is evolving. Senior Leader decisions are part of the CSA's effort to align processes to support the ARFORGEN model.

- 6. The Army Plan (TAP) is the principal Army guidance for development of the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. The SA and CSA provide specific guidance through the TAP to develop the Army's POM submission. The TAP articulates the transition of DoD guidance to all Services into Army specific planning. Also, the TAP initiates the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process (**Figure 14**).
- 7. To get from the current force to the CSA's **vision** for the future force, we have to understand the inputs and processes that may modify the **current force** into the **future force**. The TAP, RDA and Army Modernization Strategy are inputs. Additionally, OSD, Combatant Commands, previous decisions, approved restructuring initiatives and outside influences such as total strength, resources, lessons learned, rotational analysis, stationing

(BRAC) and procurement decisions are also inputs to the TAA process. Based on the guidance and inputs, we modify our current force.

8. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process called Total Army Analysis (TAA). Detailed information can be found in the TAA Primer at

www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil.

9. The purpose of TAA is to develop requirements and authorizations defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource.




Figure 14

10. The TAA process determines the size and content of the Army force structure capturing the Army's Operating Force, support forces and the Army's generating force. The TAA process develops the recommended programmed force (POM Force). The POM Force changes over time based on changes in strategy, resourcing and guidance.
11. TAA determines the requirements (number and type of units) through computer modeling. The organizational requirements are based on the consumption factors, allocation rules and scenarios. The total requirements are prioritized based on the force sizing planning guidance. At the end of the requirements phase, the VCSA approves the total requirements and directs the initiation of the resourcing phase.
12. During the Resourcing phase, the requirements compete for resourcing (authorized number of units, by type) based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis and inputs from the Combatant Commanders. This phase focuses on aggregate spaces as the "coin of the realm" (officer / warrant officer / enlisted // aggregate spaces). The authorization is not by grade, skill or MOS level of detail. Each component, command and branch is competing for the limited personnel resources.
13. The requirements generated by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), through computer modeling, are compared to the currently planned, programmed and budgeted subsets in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) for all Fiscal Years. The comparison is called the MATCH Model. The model matches the type organization, the COMPO, the level of authorization, and location.
14. The **KEY OUTPUTS** from the TAA process are:
 - a. POM Force. The resulting force structure is forwarded to the CSA for approval. The CSA approved POM force is forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. The POM force contains the type organization, the FY, COMPO and the action (activation, inactivation, conversion, or reorganization).

- b. Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC provides the ARSEC, ARSTAF, commands and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) the results of the TAA process. The ARSTRUC provides force structure guidance for each command, by standard requirement code (SRC – i.e., INF, AR, FA, ADA, SC, MP, QM, TC, etc.), by Fiscal Year (FY), by action. The ARSTRUC directs the action based on leadership guidance, resources available (resources, personnel, facilities or equipment), and other force structure actions planned or programmed throughout the force.
- c. Army’s POM submission to OSD from the PPBE process.

Document Organizational Authorizations

1. After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) manages the process of documenting the decision(s) (figure 15).




Figure 15

2. USAFMSA develops the authorization documents through The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS). This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).
3. The programmed and budgeted force is documented to unit identification code (UIC) level of detail, to ensure that organizations may place demands on the functional systems of the Army.
4. Upon receipt of the Army Structure (ARSTRUC) memorandum, the components and commands prepare to conduct a forum called the Command Plan (CPlan) (figure 16).
5. G-37/FM initiates the documentation of the force structure decisions by issuing the Command Plan Guidance to the ARSTAF, commands and USAFMSA. USAFMSA builds the draft MTOEs and TDAs and distributes them to the ARSTAF and commands for review. G-37/FM hosts the CPlan in the Pentagon to identify the differences between the proposed force structure changes, documentation of the decisions and the SAMAS database. After a final review of the documents, the TAADS documents are electronically reconciled with the SAMAS database (force structure and budget files) through the automatic update transaction system




Figure 16

(AUTS). Director, FM approves the reconciled authorization documents.

6. At this point we are documenting resources, personnel, equipment, and facilities for each unit in the Army for the next 18 months.
7. Finally, the Structure and Composition System (SACS) computes the personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations based on integrating the input from BOIPs, TOEs, SAMAS, and TAADS. SACS computes personnel (PERSACS) and equipment (LOGSACS) requirements and authorizations for the next ten years, comparing existing inventory of personnel and equipment to the future authorization of personnel and equipment.
8. **Key Outputs:** SAMAS database (the Master Force/MForce), TAADS Documents (MTOE/TDA) and SACS (PER and LOG).

Acquire, Train and Distribute Personnel

1. Having developed the Authorization Document, we can now address the issues of: **ACQUIRE, TRAIN, and DISTRIBUTE** in terms of personnel.
2. Based on the results of PERSACS, more specifically PMAD (Personnel Management Authorization Document), the Human Resources Command (HRC) can compare the personnel authorizations, based on MTOEs and TDAs, to the current inventory of Soldiers by grade, skill and MOS.
3. The different personnel processes predict the recruiting, retention and training needs of the Army over the POM years.
4. HRC distributes military personnel in accordance with the MTOE and TDA authorization, Army priorities and inventory available.
5. **Figure 17** highlights several *interconnected* activities.
7. Through this collective set of processes, you can see the interface of the authorized space to the face assigned to that authorization. The DCS, G-1, assignment officers within HRC, and assignment officers within the commands manage the personnel assets within the current and projected inventory.
8. The **Key Output** is the assignment of an individual by grade, skill and MOS to a valid authorization.




Figure 17

Acquire and Distribute Equipment

1. Having developed the Authorization Document, we can now address the materiel we can **DISTRIBUTE** and what we must **ACQUIRE** in terms of equipment.

2. Based on the results of LOGSACS, Army Materiel Command (AMC), and the DCS, G-4 and G-8, compare the equipment authorizations, based on MTOEs and TDAs, to the current inventory of equipment by Line Item Number (LIN), Equipment Readiness Code (ERC) and quantity (figure 18).
3. Our logisticians acquire and allocate equipment based on:
 - a. The total REQUIREMENTS and total AUTHORIZATIONS (Line item number and quantity found in the MTOEs and TDAs).
 - b. Equipment quantities on hand.
 - c. Army PRIORITIES.
4. Leadership decisions, TAP guidance, Combatant Commanders' input and current operational needs, along with other factors --- determine how the equipment is distributed to the Army - **Including TDA organizations**.
5. The different equipping processes predict the on-hand quantities and shortages for units and preposition sets over the POM years.
6. The **Key Output** for this process is a distribution plan.




Figure 18

Provide Combat Ready Units

1. At this point - MANPOWER and EQUIPMENT have been acquired, personnel trained and both have been distributed to the Army to provide combat ready units to the Combatant Commanders.
2. There are many areas that can be evaluated to see if the Army has provided sufficient resources to meet the Combatant Commander's needs. The Combatant Commander and the Services were provided the same direction and guidance by the President and SECDEF ("Purple - Green" interface) in Figure 2.
3. Two of the issues the Army must address during this period of Transformation are STATIONING and READINESS (Figure 19).
 - a. **STATIONING.**
 - 1) The Army will field 45 AC BCTs and 28 ARNG BCTs. The stationing of each brigade is critical within limited existing facilities.
 - 2) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).




Figure 19

- 3) Each stationing issue brings FACILITY issues to the table for UNITS – such as motor pools, billets, and ranges.
 - 4) The same issues bring FACILITIES for FAMILIES –such as commissaries, post exchanges, hospitals, churches, schools, and recreational facilities to the table.
 - 5) The stationing considerations are not limited to the Active Component. They apply to the National Guard, the Army Reserve and DA Civilians.
- b. **READINESS.**
- 1) The Army must provide to the combatant commanders the force structure/capability required to meet the tasks the President and the Secretary of Defense have articulated.
 - 2) The Army is evaluated on our ability to “Provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies.” That is, provide those Combatant Commander’s with “COMBAT READY Organizations” to execute the directed missions.
4. The *Key Output* is the evaluation of how well the Army provided combat ready organizations to the *Combatant Commanders*.

III. SUMMARY

1. Although the Army Force Management Model depicts a **fairly linear model**, in a **sequential** manner, managing change may mandate that any one or several of these processes occur **simultaneously**, in **parallel**, in **compressed** format or in reverse depending on **urgency**, **risk** and senior leader **guidance**.
2. It is important to note that eventually all of the processes and systems must be addressed to field, maintain, sustain and resource the current and future Army force structure.
3. What is not depicted in the Army Force Management Model are all of the potential coordination lines between systems, processes or blocks. Alternative paths, not reflected in the model, may be needed to verify impacts of decisions, re-evaluation when a solution is rejected based on a change in strategy, threat, leadership decisions, resourcing or identification of a new capability required based on identification of a new or different capabilities gap.
4. When a solution has been determined, resourced, funded and documented, the solution becomes the major input to other processes such as the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model, Force Integration Functional Areas (FIFA), Force Feasibility Review (FFR), and Force Validation Committee (FVC) for implementation and evaluation.